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On Aggregate Fluctuations, Systemic Risk,





Pairwise covariances of firm growth rates appear to drive the variance of aggregate
growth rates in productivity, sales, and profit for public firms in the United States
over the last half-century. High-productivity firms contribute most to the covariances
driving aggregate variance, but least per dollar of market value that they generate.
This fact may explain why investors demand lower returns from high-productivity firms.
A tractable model of within-firm diversification qualitatively matches the empirical
evidence, generating endogenous first and second moments of firm and aggregate
productivity, and endogenous comovement between firm and aggregate productivity. In
the model, movements in firm productivity drive movements in firm sales and profit,
and firms’ expected excess stock returns rise as firms’ productivities covary more with
aggregate productivity, relative to their market values. A regression analysis lends
tentative empirical support to several predictions of the model.
∗Email: rory.mullen@wbs.ac.uk. I thank my dissertation committee Fabio Ghironi (chair), Yu-chin
Chen, and Philip Brock for their guidance. I thank University of Washington workshop and seminar
participants for valuable comments. All remaining errors are my own.
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1 Introduction
I drive to work—it’s faster, but driving is risky. My point is this: some risks I choose, they
aren’t imposed upon me. Firms also choose risks: they choose their production methods,
they choose their product lines, and these choices entail technology- and product-specific
risks. When many firms choose similar risks, perhaps being drawn to similar rewards, their
fortunes then rise or fall together. This comovement of firms’ fortunes creates aggregate
fluctuations, and the risks firms choose become systemic. To motivate the mechanism I have
just described, I document four facts related to the comovement of firm-level activity for a
large panel of public firms in the United States over the last half-century, and develop a
model economy that matches the facts endogenously by letting firms choose to take some
risks and avoid others. My contributions build on recent work on endogenous uncertainty
in macroeconomic models, on the microeconomic origins of aggregate fluctuations, and on
risks to equity owners in production economies.
The motivating evidence that firm-level covariance may drive aggregate fluctuations
comes from a well-known decomposition: aggregate variance equals the sum of individual
variances and pairwise covariances. Details of the decomposition depend on the aggregate
in question—whether its elements are additively separable, whether they are growth rates
or levels, whether entry and exit occur—but often a simple mathematical identity or
approximation holds, and is useful for thinking about the sources of aggregate variance. In
the simplest version, where xω is a firm variable in levels and X =
∑
Ω xω the corresponding
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The second line in equation (1) gives the above-mentioned decomposition into individual
variances and pairwise covariances. The third line in equation (1) is also useful: it says
that a firm’s covariance with the aggregate is simultaneously its contribution to aggregate
variance.
Now consider productivity, sales, and profit growth for Compustat firms: on average over
the last half-century, covariances between firm growth rates for a given variable (productivity,
sales, or profit) accounted for at between 80% and 90% of the variance of the aggregate growth
rate for that variable. The median firm in the high-productivity decile contributed over 13
times as much variance to aggregate growth rates as the median firm in the full sample,
and most of this contribution came from covariance with other firms. High-productivity
firms drive aggregate fluctuations in productivity, sales, and profit growth rates, and do so
through covariance with other firms. There are about 7,500 distinct firms in the Compustat
sample over this period, coming from nearly all industries, and producing goods equal in
value to about 20% of U.S. gross domestic product each year. Covariance matters for the
aggregate fluctuations of these firms.
It also matters for their risk. Markowitz made this point in 1952 for portfolio returns,
using a version of the above decomposition with weights. Covariance risk also underlies the
portfolio-based capital asset pricing models of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin
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(1966), and also Breeden (1979)’s consumption-based model. Mine is a productivity-based
model in which a firm’s risk depends, predominantly, on the covariance between the firm’s
productivity and aggregate productivity divided by the firm’s market value—the last term












where Vt(ω) is the firm’s market value, µ(ω) its expected productivity, and σωΩ(ω) its
covariance with aggregate productivity. This ratio, firm-aggregate productivity covariance
over market value, may help explain why low-productivity firms pay investors significantly
higher returns than high-productivity firms, as İmrohoroğlu and Tuzel (2014) have recently
pointed out, despite high-productivity firms driving aggregate fluctuations. Evidence from
Compustat suggests that low-productivity firms expose investors to more covariance risk
per dollar invested in the firm. While the firm-aggregate covariances of the median high-
productivity firm is thirteen times that of the full-sample median firm, this multiple falls
to seventy percent, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, after dividing by market value, as figure 1
illustrates.
But why is firm aggregate productivity covariance over market value lower for high-
productivity firms? Evidently, high-productivity firms are doing at least some business
that investors value, but that weakly covaries with the business of other firms. I show in
Section 4 that the cross-sectional evidence on this ratio can be explained by business-line
diversification. Empirically, high-productivity firms do operate more business lines: 2.6 on
average, against 1.5 for low-productivity firms (see table 1). Perhaps the additional segments
at high-productivity firms yield diversification benefits. In theory, risk-averse investors would
accept lower returns from high-productivity firms, if activities in some of the extra segments
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covaried less with aggregate activity, relative to the profit investors expected.1 I investigate
this explanation theoretically using a model of firm-level diversification in section 3.
Figure 1 summarizes the empirical evidence on firm-level covariance in productivity, sales,
and profit growth that motivates my theory. To highlight the pervasiveness of covariance
in all stages of value creation, the figure illustrates the evidence for growth rates of three
variables.2 Panel (a) shows the fraction of variance in aggregate growth rates due to pairwise
covariance in firm-level growth rates. On average, pairwise covariances account for about
85% of aggregate variance each year. Panel (b) illustrates firm-aggregate covariance for
firms sorted into productivity deciles. Recall that firm-aggregate covariance measures an
individual firm’s contribution to aggregate variance; high-productivity firms contribute far
more than the median firm contributes. Panel (c) illustrates firm-aggregate covariance
relative to market value. Interpret this statistic as a metric for the risk that firms poses to
investors per dollar invested; by this metric, high-productivity firms expose investors much
less risk than the median firm. This firm-level evidence on covariance provides a useful
yardstick to measure the success of economic models explaining cross-sectional stock returns,
or the success of economic models in explaining the microeconomic origins of aggregate
fluctuations. My first contribution is to document this firm-level evidence.
Because firm-level productivity covariance appears to drive both firm risk and aggregate
fluctuations in the data, a single model capable of producing an empirically plausible firm-
level covariance structure would contribute to explanations of both firm risk and aggregate
fluctuations. My second contribution is along these lines. I construct a DSGE model in
1Authors in the finance literature have primarily focused on the impact of firm diversification on firm
value. Villalonga (2004) finds a value premium on diversified firms, consistent with the theory here. Here,
the emphasis is on diversification and stock returns. In this context, Wang (2012) finds that less-diversified
firms pay higher returns, consistent with the theory presented here. I discuss this further in section 2.
2Through the exposition, productivity refers to measured revenue total factor productivity, and in the
empirical applications is estimated following Olley and Pakes (1996) and İmrohoroğlu and Tuzel (2014).
Sales refers to net sales; profit refers to operating income before depreciation, both as reported in 10-K
financial statements filed with the SEC, unless adjusted by Compustat.
5
which firm-level productivity covariance arises endogenously. The model produces aggregate
fluctuations and cross-sectional patterns in firm-level systematic risk that are consistent
with the empirical patterns. I endogenize covariance by allowing heterogeneous firms to
choose risky business lines for themselves, from a menu that I specify exogenously. When
firms choose similar business lines, their productivities covary. Mathematically, covariance
in the model has a simple factor structure that is flexible and tractable. The mechanism
relies on high-productivity firms choosing to operate a greater number of business lines, just
as firms do in the Compustat data. My model predicts that firms with higher productivity
have higher firm-aggregate productivity covariance, but lower firm-aggregate productivity
covariance per dollar of market value. The motivating evidence in Figure 1 demonstrates
the empirical plausibility of these model predictions, in particular for productivity and
sales. Regressions controlling for alternative explanations provide formal inference. For
productivity, sales, and profit, I regress firm-aggregate covariances of productivity, sales, and
profit growth rates on firm-level productivity and a set of control variables, and find support
for two model predictions. The model also predicts that firms with similar productivities
have higher correlations with each other, and this pattern is weakly visible in the data and
illustrated in panel (d) of Figure 1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 relates this work to existing
literature. Section 3 introduces a formal model based on business-line diversification.
Section 4 presents propositions that describe the model’s main mechanism, and demonstrate
the model’s qualitative consistency with the motivating empirical evidence. Section 5 provides
details on the productivity estimation procedure and firm-level covariance calculations used
to produce the motivating evidence in Figure 1. Section 5 also presents regressions that


















































































































sets Ωi × Ωj , i, j =
1, 2, . . . , 10, where
Ωi is the set of
firms in productiv-
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Figure 1 – Evidence on Compustat Firm-Level Covariance Structure. Compustat Annual Fundamentals,
1966-2015. Firm-level covariance statistics computed in 6-year rolling windows; firms grouped into productivity
deciles using moving averages of estimated total factor productivities. Productivity estimates are free of time-industry
effects. Sample includes all Compustat firms with no missing values in each 6-year window, excluding financial and
utilities firms, firms with large merges, and the smallest 10% of firms by market value. Details are given in section 5.
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2 Literature
This section relates my work to recent work on endogenous uncertainty in macroeco-
nomic models, microeconomic origins of aggregate fluctuations, financial risk in production
economies, business cycles in the firm cross section, and corporate diversification. A notable
feature of the model I propose is that it accords, at least qualitatively, with several disparate
areas of economic research. For example, the model in Section 3 endogenously generates
aggregate uncertainty from microeconomic shocks, captures features of the cross-section
of stock returns, matches a host of stylized facts related to cross-sectional volatility and
co-movement, and captures empirical regularities related to the number of technologies,
product lines, and business segments firms operate. The following paragraphs discuss
connections between the this work and several related areas of research.
Endogenous uncertainty in macroeconomic models. The financial crisis of 2007 led to
calls for macroeconomic models in which aggregate fluctuations arise endogenously. Romer
(2016) complains about models in which aggregate fluctuations “are not influenced by the
action that any person takes.” Stiglitz (2011) questions the relevance of real business cycle
models for work on recessions, because the models presume “that the origin of fluctuations
[is] exogenous.” These criticisms apply only partially to the class of models to which
mine belongs: production economies with firm heterogeneity and random productivity. In
many models within this class, exogenous productivity shocks at the firm level propagate
endogenously from firms to aggregate variables. Because the propagation is endogenous,
the aggregate fluctuations are endogenous. Dutta and Polemarchakis (1992) offer an early
example of this type of propagation, Gabaix (2011) and Acemoglu et al. (2012) are recent
example, and I review more of this literature below.
Still, within this class of models, productivity shocks are often exogenous at the firm level,
so at the firm level the Stiglitz-Romer critique is valid in many cases. Decker et al. (2016)
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provide a notable exception. In their framework, firms choose markets in which to operate,
and market exposure determines firm risk. In contrast to Decker et al., who study changes
in idiosyncratic firm risk and business cycles, I study systematic firm risk and cross-sectional
stock returns. In my model, systematic risk arises endogenously: individual firms choose
their production technologies, and their choices determine the probability distribution of
their productivity shocks. When many firms choose the same technology, shocks to that
technology generate comovement amongst firms using it, and the comovement generates
aggregate fluctuations. In this sense, I provide a framework for addressing the Stiglitz-Romer
critique in production economies with heterogeneous firms and random productivity.
Microeconomic origins of aggregate fluctuations.
The literature on aggregate uncertainty arising from individual uncertainty—what has
been called the microeconomic origins of aggregate fluctuations— was born out of a literature
on aggregate certainty arising from individual uncertainty. I think I can cite an early
paper coauthored by French, and maybe some papers mentioned in Kirman:1981aa and
then, for a more recent example, in general equilibrium theory, cite Malinvaud (1972), as he
considers a large endowment economy and finds conditions under which equilibrium prices
are “sure” despite agents facing individual uncertainty. Feldman and Gilles (1985) comment
on this topic somehow.
In a first wave of research, economists then turned to the opposite case of aggregate
uncertainty arising from individual uncertainty. Jovanovic:1987aa and Bak:1993aa are
good examples of this. Malinvaud (1972) in fact also belongs to this wave, because he
briefly considers the case where cross-sectionally correlated individual uncertainty gives
rise to aggregate uncertainty, but it isn’t his “first aim.” Al-Najjar (1995) does primarily
focus on generating aggregate uncertainty from individual uncertainty, and provides a more
general construction for economies with a continuum of agents. While both Malinvaud and
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Al-Najjar (1995) impose the cross-sectional correlation structure exogenously, the model I
propose gives rise to it endogenously in a general equilibrium production economy.3
although his purpose was not to generate aggregate uncertainty specifically, Hulten
(1978) may also belong to this first wave, if only because it motivated a second wave.
Hulten showed how changes in aggregate output and productivity can be expressed as a
weighted average of changes in individual output and productivity. Gabaix (2011) then
picked this insight up showed how aggregate uncertainty can arise even from idiosyncratic
individual uncertainty, as long as the aggregation weights are sufficiently skewed in their
distribution across agents. Carvalho and Gabaix (2013) use a granular model economy to
explain movements in U.S. GDP volatility. Acemoglu et al. (2012) show how input-output
networks can magnify idiosyncratic shocks, focusing on sectoral shocks, and Herskovic et al.
(2017) develop a model in which granular effects at the firm level lead to sectoral shocks that
propagate through networks and generate aggregate fluctuations. Baqaee and Farhi (2019)
find that idiosyncratic shocks have larger aggregate effects when Hulten’s approximation is
taken to a second order.
Where the above papers have all focused on economies with a countable number of agents,
there is a parallel literature that focuses on economies with a continuum of agents. These
are sometimes referred to as countable and continuum economies. In continuum economies,
only Malinvaud (1972) considers how “collective risks”, as he calls them, can be generated
from “individual risks” faced by individual agents. He finds that cross-sectional correlation,
—that is, single risks that commonly affect all agents in an economy. Malinvaud shows how
collective risks can arise in continuum economies where atomless agents face individual
but not independent risks. Collective risks arise through cross-sectional correlations in the
individual risks.
3Kirman:1981aa gives a nice history of continuum economies and goes over some of the measure theory
involved in handling them rigorously.
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Specifically in the context of aggregate fluctuations, there is In the More recently,
My work differs from the recent work because I emphasize firm-level shocks that co-
vary, rather than independent firm-level shocks, as a crucial firm-level driver of aggregate
fluctuations. My focus on covariance is motivated by the Compustat evidence, where
covariance in firm-level activity appears to account for between 80% and 90% of variance
in aggregate activity—and this applies also to productivity growth rates, which are often
modeled in the literature as idiosyncratic. While none of the recent work places quite the
same emphasis on covariance, Baqaee and Farhi (2019) do consider the case of correlated
shocks in their second-order approximations and find that correlated shocks can have large
aggregate effects. Malinvaud (1972) considers a sequence of Dutta and Polemarchakis (1992)
briefly consider cases where microeconomic shocks covary locally, but where covariance
decays rapidly enough in the distance between the shocks that no fluctuations are generated.
In my model, covariance does not decay rapidly: roughly, this is because some technologies
are used by nearly all firms and are therefore highly systemic. This statement is true even
for a continuum of technologies and a continuum of firms. I provide formal justification in
the propositions in Section 4.
Financial risk in production economies. Explaining cross-sectional differences in stock
returns has long been of interest in finance. In a 2011 survey covering thirty years of research
on cross-sectional differences in stock returns, van Dijk remarks on a trend toward asset
pricing in general equilibrium production economies. This trending line of research seeks an
“economic theory that identifies the state variables that drive variation in returns related to
firm size.”
Berk et al. (1999) provide the prototypical example, albeit in a partial equilibrium
setting, where firms invest in projects with uncertain cash flows and durations. The cash
flows covary with an exogenous pricing kernel, and a firm’s set of active projects determines
11
the firm’s risk. My work is closely related to Berk et al., with production technologies here
playing a similar role to investment projects there. Our models differ in two important ways:
first, in my work each technology’s covariance with aggregate productivity is endogenous—it
depends on the number of firms that choose to operate the technology. Second, my pricing
kernel is endogenous, and, through market clearing conditions, ultimately also depends on
firm-level technology choices.
Gomes (2001) develops a general equilibrium model in which financing constraints
generate an empirically plausible cross section of stock returns. More recent models have
relied on convex capital adjustment costs to produce differences in returns; examples include
Gomes et al. (2003), İmrohoroğlu and Tuzel (2014), and Zhang (2017). However, Clementi
and Palazzo (2018) find that capital adjustment costs are empirically too small to explain
cross-sectional differences in returns, and suggest that additional explanations are needed.
Donangelo et al. (2017) propose a novel labor leverage mechanism. I view my work as
complementary to these lines. I emphasize business line diversification as a source of cross-
sectional differences in returns. While the diversification argument is not new to the finance
literature, my implementation in a general equilibrium production economy is new, to the
best of my knowledge. I discuss the diversification literature further below.
Finally, the real business cycle literature also studies stock returns in production
economies, but focuses mostly on the time series properties of returns. Examples in-
clude Rouwenhorst (1995), Jermann (1998), and Lettau (2003). In my work, as in the
traditional real business cycle literature, fluctuations are driven by technology shocks. But
in my work there is a continuum of technologies and firms solve a technology choice problem;
these features provide a microeconomic foundation for the traditional aggregate technology
shock, and, in particular, one that is consistent with the cross-sectional evidence on stock
returns.
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The cross section of firms over the business cycle. Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 1
characterizes firm-aggregate covariance and firm-aggregate covariance over market value for
productivity, sales, and profit growth in the cross section of firms. That analysis differs
from, but compliments, recent and earlier empirical work characterizing the cross section
of firms over the business cycle. The early work is most closely associated with Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994), who find that small firms respond more than large firms to monetary
policy events because, as they argue, small firms face greater credit market frictions. Chari
et al. (2007), revisiting the Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) work, find in a longer time series
that small and large firms respond in the same way to fluctuations in aggregate economic
activity. Both studies use QFR manufacturing data. Other recent findings are mixed:
Gourio (2007) finds that small firms’ profits are more procyclical. Crouzet and Mehrotra
(2017) find that small firms are slightly more responsive to the business cycle, but only more
so than the largest half-percent of firms, and not because of financial frictions. Moscarini
and Postel-Vinay (2009) focus on employment and find in multiple datasets that large firms
are more responsive to the business cycle.
I contribute an additional data point and a new perspective on this line of empirical work.
My methodology differs, in that I use an aggregate variance decomposition to highlight
the dual nature of firm-aggregate covariance: on the one hand, firm-aggregate covariance
measures firm contributions to aggregate variance, on the other, it measures firm exposure
to aggregate fluctuations. I find that productivity, sales and profit growth rates at high-
productivity firms covary more with aggregate growth rates, but less per dollar of market
value. My interpretation is that high-productivity firms contribute more to aggregate
variance, but expose investors to less business cycle risk.
Corporate diversification. The key mechanism in my model is business-line diversification,
where a business line consists of a single technology and the consumption good it produces,
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and where high-productivity firms operate more business lines using technologies that few
other firms use.
Empirical work suggests that high-productivity firms are indeed better diversified, both
in terms of product lines and production methods. Bernard et al. (2010) document the
prevalence of multi-product firms in U.S. manufacturing, and in regressions they find
a positive correlation between product adding and firm-level productivity. Broda and
Weinstein (2010) analyze ACNielson bar code data and find that large firms sell a far greater
number and variety of products at the upc, brand, module, and product group levels. Large
firms are on average high-productivity firms, so this work also suggests greater product
diversification at high-productivity firms. Empirical evidence on technology use is scarce,
but Dunne (1991) uses data from the U.S. Census Survey of Manufacturing Technology to
estimate adoption probabilities for seventeen advanced technologies, and finds that large
manufacturers were more likely than small to adopt each of the seventeen technologies in
the survey.
In theoretical work, firm diversification often entails technological change. For Ansoff
(1957), firms diversify when they sell new products in new markets, and diversification
typically requires “new skills, new techniques, and new facilities.” Frankel (1955) provides an
early description of the costs and considerations associated with introducing new production
methods alongside old, and Gort (1962) argues that diversifying firms typically enter fast
growing industries with high rates of technological change. My model captures much of
this technological diversification theory by allowing product diversification only through
technology adoption, and by introducing a fixed cost for each technology that firms operate.
In the name of simplicity, the model does not differentiate goods by industry (beyond
consumption and capital) so it misses some of the richness of Gort’s theory. It also misses
strategic aspects of technology adoption, as emphasized by Reinganum (1981) and Fudenberg
14
et al. (1983), for example.
Gollop and Monahan (1991) survey a literature on index measures of firm diversification.
The best measures are sensitive to a firm’s product count, the distribution of its sales across
products, and the similarity of the products themselves. Unfortunately, Compustat segment
data only allow for simple business line counts, a coarse measure of diversification with
little cross-sectional variation. For example, high-productivity firms report on average 2.6
segments each, compared to 1.5 for low-productivity firms.
Finally, a large finance literature focuses on corporate diversification and firm value.
Martin and Sayrak (2003) survey the literature and describe the prevailing view in the 1990s
as one of diversified firms trading at discounts. With the availability of more granular data,
this view is changing. For example, Villalonga (2004) compares Compustat data with U.S.
Census data that allows for finer measures of diversification and finds that diversified firms
trade at a premium relative to focused firms when diversification is measured in the Census
segment data but not when measured in the coarser Compustat segment data. Wang (2012)
looks at stock returns rather than firm value, and finds that diversified firms in Compustat
have lower returns on average. He argues that diversification affects a firm’s systemic risk
though its growth options. The predictions of my theoretical model are consistent with the
recent empirical work by Villalonga and Wang.
3 Theoretical Framework
I now construct a simple two-sector production economy that rationalizes the motivating
evidence presented in the introduction. In the model, firms produce capital and differentiated
consumption goods for a representative household. Capital is produced by a representative
firm, while consumption goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive
firms. The latter firms each produce a number of different consumption goods using a
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number of different technologies. The technologies are non-rivalrous, so any number of firms
can use the same technology, and the varieties are differentiated by technology and producer,
so different firms using the same technology produce different goods. Firms choose their
technology sets from a continuum of available technologies, each technology is a distinct
source of randomness, and technology is the only source of randomness in the model. In
particular, there is no purely-aggregate source of randomness, though economic aggregates
do still fluctuate randomly. The remaining primitive assumptions and equations of the
model are given below, and propositions in Section 4 explain the main mechanisms and
highlight key results.
3.1 Consumption Goods Producers
Firms indexed by ω ∈ Ω compete monopolistically for household demand for consumption
goods. Each firm uses multiple technologies, and each technology produces a distinct
differentiated consumption good. The total mass of active firms will later be normalized to
one.
3.1.1 Production
Firms use technologies that combine labor and capital to produce consumption goods at
constant returns to scale. Each technology has its own random productivity multiplier,
denoted zt(v). Technological productivity is the first of two productivity types in the model,
and is the only source of randomness. The second productivity type is firm-specific and non-
random, and denoted z(ω). One interpretation is that the firm-specific productivity reflects
management. Bloom et al. (2016) document a wide dispersion in management practices
across firms, and find evidence that this dispersion in management practices explains some
of the observed dispersion in productivity across firms. Firm-specific productivity follows a
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Pareto distribution over firms, with shape parameter κ and scale parameter set to one.4 I
assume Cobb-Douglas production functions, and write firm ω’s output yt(v, ω) of the variety
created by technology v at time t as







where parameter α controls the cost share attributed to the capital kt(v, ω) and the labor
lt(v, ω) the firm uses to produce the good.
Finally, note that capital is homogeneous in this set-up, in contrast to traditional vintage
capital models. Firms can move capital freely across technologies and combine it with
labor in varying proportions. This assumption is analytically convenient, and increasingly
plausible economically, in light of the increasing flexibility of manufacturing systems observed
by Milgrom and Roberts (1990).5
3.1.2 Profit Maximization
Profits and prices are expressed in units of an aggregate consumption basket that will be
specified in section 3.2. Firms take the wage wt and the capital rental rate rt as given, but
act as monopolists in each of their differentiated goods, setting prices to maximize profits.
Denote by pt(v, ω) the price that firm ω sets for the variety it produces with technology v,
4Firms don’t draw their productivities randomly from the Pareto distribution, as this can lead to
measurability problems (Uhlig:1996aa; see Doob, 1953; Feldman and Gilles, 1985; Judd, 1985; Khan
and Sun, 1999, for details and proposed solutions). Here, I assume firm-specific productivities were
assigned deterministically at some point in the past. Thus, the Pareto distribution here lacks a probability
interpretation and needn’t integrate to one.
5In a future version I intend to extend the model by indexing capital according to vintage and restricting
the use of capital to technologies of corresponding vintage. The extension would differ from the putty-clay
assumption made in many vintage capital models, in that it would place no restriction on the proportions
in which inputs are combined in production. It would, however, bring the model closer to vintage capital
models in the style of Solow (1960), which tend to allow for easier aggregation. See Johansen (1959) for an
early putty-clay model, or Boucekkine et al. (2011) for a recent survey of vintage capital models of both
varieties.
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and write the firm’s gross profit from producing yt(v, ω) units of the variety as
πt(v, ω) = pt(v, ω)yt(v, ω)− rtkt(v, ω)− wtlt(v, ω). (4)
A firm’s total gross profit Πt(ω) equals the sum of gross profits from each of its varieties:
Πt(ω) =
∫
V(ω) πt(v, ω)λ(dv). Firms are owned by the representative household, so they use
the household’s stochastic discount factor mt,s to discount expected future profits. They
maximize value by choosing optimal factor inputs and prices for each differentiated good,
subject to the production function given by equation (3), and subject to downward-sloping
household demand given later by equation (39). Let V(ω) represent the set of technologies











s.t. (3) and (39) ∀ v ∈ V(ω).
(5)
3.1.3 Technology Choice
Firms choose their technology sets, denoted V(ω), from a fixed set V = [ v,∞) of available
technologies, and make their chooses one period in advance. The parameter v is exogenous
and positive. There is no cost to adopting or abandoning a technology, but firms pay a fixed
cost in each period that they operate a technology, paid in units of capital. The period fixed






where γ governs the availability of technologies with low fixed operating costs, and where
the specific functional form was chosen for analytical tractability. The coefficient Yt+1
simplifies the model dramatically: it causes period fixed costs to rise and fall with aggregate
production Yt, rendering the technology choice problem—and therefore all uncertainty in
the model—completely static. Dynamic uncertainty is an attractive feature, but beyond the
scope of this paper. In on-going work, I relax the simplifying assumption and study the
dynamics of technology adoption, obsolescence, and endogenous uncertainty in an otherwise
similar environment.
Under the present simplifying assumptions, the rule for choosing technology sets that








Finally, an aim of this paper is to characterize the stochastic properties of firm-level
and economy-wide productivity aggregates, but technical challenges arise when each firm’s
technology set is a continuous subset of V. Aggregation then requires integrating over
uncountable sets of random variables, and care must be taken to preserve randomness in
the aggregates. To this end, I make the following assumption on technological productivity:
zt(v)
θ−1 := εt,dve ∀ v ∈ V, (8)
with {εt,1, εt,2, . . . } a countable set of random variables. Think of the εt,n’s as fundamental
technologies upon which production technologies represented by the zt(v)’s are built. I make
the following assumptions on the fundamental technologies: for all n,m ∈ N and s, t ∈ Z,

















= 0. This construction is a special case of the general construction developed
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in Al-Najjar (1995), and is specifically designed to preserve risk in continuum economies.6
3.2 Household
Each period, the representative household spends Ct on consumption, invests It in physical
capital, and ownsa portfolio of firms, each valued at Vt(ω). To pay for its consumption
and investments, the household sells to firms a fixed quantity of labor L at wage wt; it
rents to firms the physical capital Kt it owns at interest rate rt; and it collects firms’ net
profits, where net profit is gross profit Πt(ω) minus fixed costs Ft(ω). The budget constraint
summarizes the household’s sources and uses of funds. In units of consumption, write the

















where St(ω) represents the household’s firm ownership share. Capital depreciates at rate δ,
and therefore evolves according to
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt. (10)
The household is impatient, risk averse, loves variety in consumption, and views all
consumption goods as equally substitutable. I capture these preferences formally with a
6Al-Najjar considers collections of random variables f indexed by the measure space (T, T , τ), where
T = [0, 1] is a continuous parameter space, and ft = gt + ht, with aggregate component gt =
∑∞
k=1 βkηk,
{η1, η2, . . . } a set of orthonormal random variables, and idiosyncratic component ht such that E[xht] = 0
τ -a.e. for any random x defined on the same probability space as ht. In Al-Najjar’s notation, I consider the
case of ht = 0 τ -a.e., and βk := βk(t) = 1 if k − 1 < t ≤ k and zero otherwise. Here, V corresponds to T , v
to t, zt(v) to gt, and εs,n to ηk. It is worth noting that the special case I consider extends trivially using
Al-Najjar’s construction to cases that feature idiosyncratic shocks to individual technologies or individual
firms, and to cases where shocks are correlated across individual technologies.
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logarithmic period utility function defined over a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregate of
differentiated goods and discounted at rate β over time.7 The set-up allows the household to
allocate resources in two stages. In the first stage, the household allocates resources between













s.t. (9) and (10) ∀ s ≥ t.
(11)
In the second stage, the household optimally allocates resources among differentiated goods

























I discussion the household problem and provide further derivations in appendix A.1.1.
3.3 Capital Producer
For convenience, I separate capital production from consumption goods production in
distinct sectors. Doing so reduces the number of state variables in the technology choice
problem, and it simplifies aggregation. Separating production serves no purpose beyond
this convenience, so a basic specification of capital production will suffice.
7Recall that logarithmic utility captures a special case of risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability,
where both the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
equal one.
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A representative and privately-owned firm supplies the household with capital. As in the
consumption goods sector, the firm here combines labor and capital in a constant-returns-
to-scale production function with a stochastic productivity multiplier. The productivity
multiplier is an aggregate of the technological and firm-specific productivities of consumption
goods producers. Because the consumption and capital goods producers are subject to the
same aggregate fluctuations, the price of the consumption basket correlates perfectly with
the price of capital. The relative price therefore equals the constant markup of consumption
goods producers; I normalize this price to one by choice of capital units.
The capital producer chooses capital and labor inputs to maximize profit, taking prices
as given. Write the production function as Ĩt = Zt(kt)α(lt)1−α, the gross profit function as




where the maximization problem is subject to the production and gross profit functions above,
and where productivity Zt is specified in more detail in Proposition 4.2. See Appendix A.1.1
for optimality conditions from the decision problems in Equations (5), (11) and (13).
3.4 Equilibrium




ω∈Ω,v∈V , factor market prices




ω∈Ω at which the household budget constraint is satisfied,
the consumption and capital goods markets clear, capital and labor factor markets clear, the
stock market clears, optimality conditions in equations (32) to (34), (41) and (42) (found in




ω∈Ω contain all technologies
that satisfy the adoption rule in equation (7) and none that violate it. See Appendix A.1.3
for details and steady-state equilibrium expressions.
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4 Main Propositions
The propositions in this section communicate two nice features of the theoretical framework:
first, that the framework is analytically tractable; and second, that the framework produces
uncertainty and covariance endogenously. The proofs are straightforward but tedious, and I
provide them with some discussion in Appendix A.1.2.
Proposition 4.1 shows that a minor modification to the model in Section 3 completely
changes the interpretation of uncertainty as arising from fluctuations in demand rather than
from fluctuations in technological productivity. The proposition highlights the flexibility of
the model, showing that random fluctuations in demand produce results that are similar in
many ways to those in the model with random fluctuations in technological productivity.
Proposition 4.2 characterizes aggregation, highlighting the analytical tractability of the model.
It states that the model can be aggregated in two ways: over technologies, and over firms; and
that special productivity averages completely summarize the economy’s technological and
firm-specific heterogeneity. Proposition 4.3 characterizes firm-level technology sets. It states
that profit-maximizing firms use all available technologies below a firm-specific cost threshold,
and that high-productivity firms have higher cost thresholds. Conveniently, each firm’s cost
threshold is enough to fully characterize its technology set. Proposition 4.4 highlights how
firm technology choices endogenize uncertainty in the model. It gives closed-form expressions
for the endogenous first and second moments of firm and aggregate productivity distributions,
assuming firms operate the technologies they would choose in non-stochastic steady state.
As it happens, these technology sets are first-order approximations to the sets firms would
choose in a stochastic world. Proposition 4.5 characterizes comovement, and highlights
qualitative features the model shares with the data. It gives an exact closed-form expression
for endogenous firm-aggregate productivity covariance, and an approximate expression for
firm-aggregate productivity covariance over market value. Finally, proposition 4.7 shows
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how covariance risk affects stock returns. It gives an approximate expression for expected
excess returns in terms of firm-aggregate productivity covariance over market value, and
states that expected returns are lower for high-productivity firms.
4.1 Random Fluctuations in Demand
Random fluctuations in demand may influence firm-level productivity estimates through
prices, because the productivity estimates are based on firms’ reported revenues—the product
of prices and quantities (see De Loecker et al., 2017, for a recent discussion). Demand-
induced fluctuations in firm-level revenue can be difficult to distinguish from supply-induced
fluctuations, and I make no attempt here. Instead, proposition 4.1 states that a modified
model—with shocks to preferences rather than technologies—produces the same firm-level
covariance structure as the model with technology shocks presented in section 3. The point
is that covariance arises because firms choose their business risks, not because those risks
come specifically from supply or demand.
Proposition 4.1 (Random Fluctuations in Demand). Let zt(v) now be a random preference
multiplier. Replace the stochastic production function in equation (3) with equation (3′)
below, and the non-stochastic preferences in equation (12) with equation (12′) below:




















Then the propositions of this section remain true after derivation of the appropriate stochastic
household demand curve for individual varieties. The proof is in the appendix.
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One interpretation of the modified model is that fluctuations in preferences are specific
to product features, and product features are specific technologies. I return to the original
equations (3) and (12) and the supply-side interpretation for the remainder of the exposition.
4.2 Aggregation
To characterize the endogenous probability distributions of firm-level and economy-wide
productivity, aggregation is necessary. Fortunately, the model aggregates easily, both over
sets of technologies and over sets of firms, despite the heterogeneity in each of these sets. It
is therefore possible to find nice analytical expressions for many endogenous variables at
different levels of aggregation. For instance, production can be viewed at the differentiated-
good level, the firm level, or the economy-wide level, and can be expressed in each case as
a Cobb-Douglas production function of appropriately-aggregated capital and labor. The
model is thus quite useful for studying microeconomic sources of aggregate fluctuation.
Proposition 4.2 characterizes aggregates in terms of special productivity variables. The
aggregation strategy I employ was first developed by Houthakker (1955), further developed
by Melitz (2003) to study trade, and further still by Ghironi and Melitz (2005) to study
macroeconomic dynamics and trade. Here, the aggregation occurs in two stages.
Proposition 4.2 (Aggregation). A productivity aggregate over technologies summarizes all












A productivity aggregate over firms summarizes all of the firm-specific and technological
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Aggregate factor demands, production, and profit can be written in terms of aggregate
productivities and variables that either do not vary across firms, in the case of firm aggregates,
or do not vary across firms or technologies, in the case of economy-wide aggregates. The
proof is in the appendix.
The aggregate expressions for factor demands, output, and profit take simple forms,
and suggest a close relationship between the economy here with multi-product, multi-
technology firms, and simpler production economies with single-technology, single-product
firms, or with a single representative firm. For instance, the basic Cobb-Douglas production
structure is preserved in aggregation. The heterogeneous technologies do, however, constrain
the stochastic processes driving productivity aggregates; the constraints force the model
to capture qualitative features of cross-sectional evidence from Compustat on firm-level
covariance, and first and second moments of firm-level productivity. Again, the model
captures these cross-sectional features endogenously by presenting firms with a technology
choice problem.
4.3 Technology Choice
Firms choose their technology sets in the model, and because technology is the only source
of randomness, the choices firms make ultimately determine the probability distributions of
random productivity shocks to firms and the aggregate economy. The technology choice
problem is static under the simplifying assumptions made on the primitives of the model.

























































(b) Overlapping technology sets
Figure 2 – An illustration of the technology choice problem facing firms. Figure 2(a) on the left illustrates
the technology choice problem for firm ω. The vertical axis measures costs and benefits associated with firm ω’s
operation of different technologies. The horizontal axis represents the set of available technologies, arranged left to
right from least to most expensive in terms of fixed costs. The horizontal expected discounted gross profit curve
represents firm ω’s expected benefit from operating the available technologies. The upward-sloping fixed cost curve
represents the fixed cost associated with each technology. Firm ω’s technology set is determined by the intersection
of the expected gross profit curve and the fixed cost curve at point v(ω). The firm can profitably produce only with
technologies to the left of this point. Figure 2(b) on the right illustrates the technology choice problems of two firms:
firm ω1 with low productivity and ω2 with high productivity. Note that the technology sets of these two firms overlap.
Note in particular that the low-productivity firm’s technology set is a proper subset of the high-productivity firm’s
technology set, so that, if only these two firms exist, there are some technologies that only the high productivity firm
ω2 operates, indicated by the lighter shaded region between the threshold points v(ω) and v(ω1).
following period, after paying fixed operating costs in units of physical capital. The fixed
cost differs across technologies, low for some, high for others, and most firms operate only
a subset of the technologies available in V. Because some firms have higher firm-specific
productivity, they are able to operate profitably at higher fixed costs, and therefore choose
to operate a greater number of technologies. Proposition 4.3 characterizes the technology
choices that individual firms make.
Proposition 4.3 (Technology sets). In non-stochastic steady state, any firm ω with produc-
tivity z(ω) ≥ z chooses technology set V(ω) =
{
v ∈ V : v ≤ v ≤ v(ω)
}
, where the endogenous
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Firms with z(ω) < z do not produce. Under parameter restrictions, firms ω1 and ω2
with productivities z < z(ω1) < z(ω2) choose technology sets such that Vt(ω1) ⊂ Vt(ω2).
The above cut-offs are also first-order approximate to those that obtain in a stochastic
environment. The proof is in the appendix.
Panel (a) of Figure 2 illustrates the technology choice problem of an arbitrary firm ω.
Available technologies are arranged along the horizontal axis, and expected gross profit and
operating cost measured on the vertical axis. The assumptions made on the fundamental
productivity shocks εs,dve in Section 3 imply that the expected gross profit curve is horizontal
to a first-order approximation, while the operating cost curve is assumed to increase in the
technology index v. The intersection of gross profit and operating cost curves marks firm ω’s
cost threshold, and the firm cannot profitably diversify into new technologies and business
lines above this cost threshold.
4.4 Firm and Aggregate Productivity
The expected values and variances of the random firm-level and economy-wide productivity
aggregates are endogenous, because they depend on the technology sets that firms choose
to operate, and firms make this choice endogenously. I use the cost threshold from the
technology choice problem in Proposition 4.3 to derive explicit expressions for the expected
values and variances of firm-level and economy-wide productivity in Proposition 4.3.
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Proposition 4.4 (Productivity First and Second Moments). Let technology sets be those
that firms choose in non-stochastic steady state. Then the first and second moments of



















The first and second moments of aggregate productivity are given by µ and σ2, respectively:
µ = µεζµ1z
ζµ2 , (20)
σ2 = σ2ε ζσ1z
ζσ2 . (21)
Under parameter restrictions, the first and second moments of all productivity aggregates
are positive and finite, and for any firms ω1 and ω2 with z(ω1) < z(ω2), it holds that
µt(ω1) < µt(ω2) and σ2t (ω1) < σ2t (ω2). The proof is in the appendix.
4.5 Productivity Comovement
Covariance in the model arises from overlapping technology sets: when firms use similar
technologies, they are subject to similar fluctuations in technological productivity, and their
productivities covary. Panel (b) of Figure 2 illustrates this effect. Because high-productivity
firms have larger technology sets and produce at greater scale, they have more overlap with
other firms, and higher covariances.
High-productivity firms are also more profitable than other firms, and so have higher
market values, but above a low threshold, the ratio of covariance to market value falls in
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firm productivity. The ratio is falling because more productive firms use some technologies
that few other firms use; these technologies generate profit for the firm, which raises market
value, but contributes little to the covariance between firm and aggregate productivity. As
a firm’s productivity approaches the productivity cut-off z from above, both its covariance
and its market value race to zero.
Proposition 4.5 (Firm-to-Aggregate Productivity Covariance). Let technology sets be those
that firms choose in the non-stochastic steady state. Then the covariance between firm and















The covariance between firm and aggregate productivity, expressed as a fraction of firm





























Under parameter restrictions, covariance-over-value falls for all z(ω) above a threshold.
The ratio also falls in the level of aggregate output. The proof is in the appendix.
In the model, firms with similar managerial productivities choose similar technology
sets, so these firms have more highly-correlated productivities. As panel (d) of Figure 2
illustrates, this effect can be seen in the data.
Proposition 4.6 (Firm-to-Firm Productivity Covariance). Let technology sets be those
that firms choose in the non-stochastic steady state, and let Zt(ω1) and Zt(ω2) be firm
productivities for firms ω1 and ω2, where Zt(ω1) < Zt(ω2). Then the correlation between
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is decreasing in the distance between productivities,
|z(ω1)− z(ω2)|. The proof is in the appendix.
4.6 Stock returns
Firm-aggregate covariance over market value measures firm-level systemic risk in the model.
In theory, a risk-averse investor should be willing to accept lower returns from high-
productivity firms, because the activities of these firms covary less with aggregate activity,
relative to the discounted future profit investors expect. As in the classical capital asset
pricing models, and the consumption based models, I am able to directly express expected
stock returns in terms of covariance—in this case, firm-aggregate productivity covariance
over market value.
Proposition 4.7 (Stock returns). Let technology sets be those that firms choose in the













where I define firm ω’s return as rt(ω) =
[
Vt+1(ω) + Πt+1(ω) − Ft+1(ω)
]
/Vt(ω), and the
risk-free rate as rf,t = m−1t,t+1. Under parameter restrictions, expected excess returns decrease
in firm productivity z(ω) for all z(ω) above a threshold. The proof is in the appendix.
The propositions in this section explain the model’s mechanism, and highlight key
results. In particular, the propositions illustrate how the technology choice mechanism
leads to endogenous first and second moments of firm-level and aggregate productivity,
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and endogenous covariance between firm and aggregate productivity. The model is able to
capture many of the features of firm-level covariance documented in the motivating evidence
in Section 1, and the propositions also show how covariance affects systemic risk and stock
returns.
5 Empirical Framework
This section describes the empirical framework I use to develop the motivating evidence
in section 1, and the regression framework I use to check key predictions of the model.
Section 5.1 describes the Compustat data and other data sources. Section 5.2 describes
the productivity estimation procedure, which I follow from Olley and Pakes (1996) and
İmrohoroğlu and Tuzel (2014). Section 5.3 describes the rolling-window covariances and
other calculations used to produce figure 1. Table 2 reports the statistics that underlie
figure 1. Section 5.4 describes the regression framework. The regressions control for firm-level
differences in financial strength, fixed firm-specific characteristics, and common aggregate
shocks.
5.1 Data Description
For accounting data I use the WRDS Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual
database, which, after cleaning, covers 67,693 observations on 7,462 distinct firms over the
period 1966–2015. Figure 3 illustrates some features of the sample. The Compustat data
cover foreign and domestic firms that are or were public in the United States.
The accounting variables used in productivity estimation and aggregate variance decom-
positions are employment (EMP); net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) as a measure
of physical capital; depreciation (DP) and accumulated depreciation (DPACT) to estimate
the age of the capital stock; net sales (SALE), which I refer to as sales; operating income
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before before depreciation (OIBDP), which I refer to as profit; and fiscal year closing share
price (PRCC_F) and common shares outstanding (CSHO) to compute market value. I use the
following additional variables to construct controls for financial strength in regressions: total
debt (DT) and common equity (CEQ) to compute leverage; interest expense (INT) to compute
the interest coverage ratio; and cash and short term investments (CHE), receivables (RECT),
and current liabilities (LCT) to compute the quick ratio. I follow İmrohoroğlu and Tuzel
(2014) and Covas and den Haan (2011) in cleaning the Compustat data: I drop financial and
utilities firms, observations prior to 1961, observations with missing values on any of the
variables used in productivity estimation or rolling-window covariances, firms involved in
large mergers, and the smallest 10% of firms by market value. I use data on nominal GDP,
and GDP and non-residential investment deflators from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
as well as Social Security Administration data on national average wage.
5.2 Productivity Estimation
For consistency with an established literature, and for consistency with my theoretical model,
I characterize the firm cross-section using estimated total factor productivity, rather than,
say, sales, employment, or market value.8 I follow the procedures in Olley and Pakes (1996)
and İmrohoroğlu and Tuzel (2014), and estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function in log
form:9
ln(Yω,t) = α0 + αK ln(Kω,t) + αL ln(Lω,t) + ln(Zω,t), (26)
8An empirical literature documents substantial differences in total factor productivity across firms: Baily
et al. (1992), Bartelsman and Doms (2000), and Foster et al. (2001) provide evidence for U.S. manufacturing,
Olley and Pakes (1996) provide evidence for the telecommunications industry and develop a now widely-used
productivity estimation procedure. Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, et al. (2009) provide cross-country evidence.
Heterogeneous productivity also plays an important role in theory: firm-level productivity shocks drive a
class of models used to study industry dynamics, beginning with Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992)
9I thank Selale Tüzel for making her productivity estimation code available online, key parts of which I
have used in this project.
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics for Compustat Firms. Firms are grouped into productivity deciles, each decile
forming a column. All statistics are averaged or aggregated within decile, then averaged over time. Averages are
reported over the forty-year period 1976–2015, and the two twenty-year periods 1976–1995 and 1996–2015; Compustat
segment data is unavailable prior to 1976. The first row of each panel shows decile productivity averages relative
to the full-sample average; averages are taken over firms, the decile average is expressed relative to the full-sample
average, then averages are taken over time. The next three row show variance, firm-aggregate covariance, and firm-
aggregate covariance-over-value, again expressed as yearly decile averages relative to yearly full-sample average, and
averaged over time. Row five shows the average number of segments reported by firms in each decile. The last two
rows show aggregate decile shares of total employment, total sales, and total profit, again averaged over time. Each
of the last two rows sums to one hundred plus rounding errors.
1976–2015 Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High
Productivity 0.39 0.50 0.58 0.66 0.74 0.84 0.96 1.13 1.42 2.78
— variance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.06 0.51 1.21 8.00
— covariance 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.25 0.48 0.84 1.67 6.37
— cov-over-val 2.46 2.54 1.09 1.26 0.75 0.65 0.53 0.30 0.08 0.34
Number of segments 1.53 1.53 1.62 1.69 1.75 1.88 2.04 2.21 2.49 2.55
Employment share 0.39 0.83 1.42 2.19 3.50 5.42 8.82 14.65 25.44 37.34
Sales share 0.26 0.55 0.92 1.46 2.23 3.51 6.21 11.27 21.29 52.29
Profit share -0.02 0.10 0.27 0.56 1.05 1.90 3.58 7.47 18.33 66.78
1996–2015
Productivity 0.33 0.45 0.54 0.62 0.70 0.80 0.92 1.10 1.42 3.12
— variance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.30 0.06 0.48 2.21 6.89
— covariance -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.23 0.51 0.87 2.11 5.95
— cov-over-val 2.65 2.76 0.79 1.04 0.79 0.75 0.60 0.22 0.03 0.38
Number of segments 1.39 1.40 1.49 1.56 1.61 1.70 1.75 1.94 2.19 2.18
Employment share 0.30 0.77 1.46 2.39 3.96 5.97 10.04 16.16 27.46 31.48
Sales share 0.19 0.50 0.88 1.44 2.32 3.58 6.74 12.17 23.89 48.29
Profit share -0.07 0.03 0.15 0.41 0.98 1.67 3.44 7.37 18.83 67.18
1976–1995
Productivity 0.45 0.55 0.62 0.70 0.78 0.88 1.00 1.16 1.41 2.44
— variance 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.54 0.21 9.12
— covariance 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.27 0.46 0.82 1.24 6.79
— cov-over-val 2.27 2.32 1.40 1.48 0.71 0.55 0.47 0.39 0.12 0.30
Number of segments 1.67 1.66 1.76 1.83 1.89 2.07 2.32 2.47 2.79 2.91
Employment share 0.47 0.89 1.38 1.99 3.04 4.87 7.60 13.14 23.42 43.19
Sales share 0.33 0.61 0.96 1.48 2.14 3.44 5.67 10.38 18.69 56.29













































Figure 3 – Descriptive Statistics for the Compustat Sample, 1966–2015. The scatter plot on the left
relates log firm size to log total factor productivity for the year 2015. Size is measured by net sales, in millions of
2009 dollars, and total factor productivity is estimated by the Olley and Pakes (1996) method. The black dots, from
left to right, are Starbucks and Boeing. I apply the logarithmic transformation because both size and productivity
distributions are highly skewed to the right. The middle figure plots the number of firms in the Compustat sample
per year, and shows this number increasing rapidly in the early part of the sample. The rapid rise is partly due to the
addition of NASDAQ in 1973, as Fama and French (1992) report. The figure on the right plots aggregate real value
added for the Compustat sample as a fraction of U.S. real GDP. This fraction tends to rise with the number of firms
in the sample. I drop financial and utilities firms, observations prior to 1961, observations with missing values on
any of the variables used in productivity estimation or rolling-window covariances. I also drop firms in large mergers,
and the smallest 10% of firms by market value.
where residual Zω,t is firm-level total factor productivity. The estimation procedure assumes
that firms can partially forecast their future productivity, and controls for the simultaneity
bias that arises from the forecasts; the procedure also controls for the selection bias that
arises because of firm entry and exit in the Compustat sample. Finally, the procedure
includes controls for time-industry effects. These measures are intended to reduce the biases
and industry-level effects that would otherwise influence the production function parameter
estimates. Appendix A.2.1 describes the estimation procedure in detail.
5.3 Aggregate Variance Decomposition
The motivating evidence for this paper derives from the aggregate variance decomposition
in equation (1). In this section, I describe the decomposition in more detail, and apply the
decomposition to Compustat data, using the total factor productivity estimates from the
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previous section to characterize the cross-section of firms. Table 2 summarizes the results of
the decomposition for firms grouped by decade and productivity decile, for productivity,
sales, and profit growth.
I compute sample variances and covariances in rolling windows for all firm pairs in
my Compustat sample, and all available years. For firm variable xω, rolling window
Wt = {t− w, . . . , t− 1, t}, and ω1, ω2 two firm indices, the sample variance and pairwise
















(xω1,s − xω1,s)(xω2,s − xω2,s). (28)
I choose a window length close to the average length of the post-war U.S. business
cycle, measured peak to peak. The average length is 68.5 months using National Bureau
of Economic Research dates, and I round up to six years because the Compustat data is
annual.10 The backward-looking window prevents future information from influencing the
variance and covariance estimates, because future information would have been unavailable
to investors trying to gauge at a point in time the risk in a firm’s future profit stream.
To compute the rolling window covariances, I restrict the sample of firms each period
to include only those firms with a sufficient history of non-missing observations. Denoting




10The NBER dates can be found at http://www.nber.org/cycles.html as of August 2018. Longer windows
give more stable sample covariances, as you would expect, but they also reduce the number of firms in the
sample, because firms with too few within-window observations must be excluded. In practice, varying the



















I use the subsample with non-missing values because firm entry, exit, and missing data are
common in Compustat and problematic for the decomposition. While consistent with my
model and with previous work (Comin and Mulani, 2004), requiring consecutive years of
non-missing observations is a costly convenience: it omits an important source of aggregate
variance, and it biases the sample of firms.11 Entry and exit are beyond the scope of this
paper, but I consider them in a companion paper.
The rolling-window approach has been employed in the economics literature by Comin
and Mulani (2004) and Forbes (2012), and does have some advantages: First, it adds a
time dimension to the covariances that would be absent if they were computed over the full
sample period, and second, it limits the practical problem of characterizing differences in
covariance across high-productivity and low-productivity firm groups, when firms frequently
move between groups—a problem known as reclassification bias, and discussed in Moscarini
and Postel-Vinay (2009).
Table 2 reports covariance statistics by decade, and for firms sorted into productivity
deciles. Pooling by decile is common in the finance literature (see Fama and French, 1992;
Fama and French, 2008; İmrohoroğlu and Tuzel, 2014; Fama and French, 2016, for other
11Entry and exit as a source of variance has recently been emphasized by Ghironi and Melitz (2005),
Bilbiie et al. (2012), Carvalho and Grassi (2015), and Clementi and Palazzo (2016). To see the implications
of omitting it here, consider aggregate variable X ′ =
∑
ΩWt
xω, where ΩWt is the set of firms with at least one

















is the set of firms with missing values, and where ΩnWt and Ω
m
Wt constitute a partition of ΩWt . My procedure
ignores the second two terms in the aggregate variance expression.
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examples). Table 3a reports the average fraction of aggregate variance explained by firm-level
pairwise covariances, averaged over decades. It shows that over 80% of variance in aggregate
productivity, sales, and profit growth is explained by firm-level covariance in all decades since
1966 for all three variables. Table 3b reports firm-level contributions to aggregate variance
for the cross-section of firms. Specifically, the table reports share-weighted covariances
between firm and aggregate productivity, sales, and profit growth rates, reported with and
without dividing by market value. The reported statistics are relative to the cross-sectional
average each year, averaged within productivity decile, then over years. Table 3b shows
that high-productivity firms contribute over six times what the average firm contributes to
aggregate variance, but only around one-third as much per dollar of market value.
5.4 Regression Analysis
The regressions in this section test key predictions of the model. The mechanism in
the model is business-line diversification, where a business line consists of a technology
and the consumption good it produces. Covariance arises when firms have overlapping
technology sets, and for high-productivity firms with many business lines, this overlap is
larger. But because high-productivity firms use some technologies that few other firms use,
the technologies add more to firm value than to firm-aggregate productivity covariance, so
that high-productivity firms are less risky per dollar invested. The model makes two basic
predictions based on this logic:
1. Ceteris paribus, covariance between firm and aggregate growth rates increases in
firm-level total factor productivity.
2. Ceteris paribus, covariance between firm and aggregate growth rates over market value
decreases in firm-level total factor productivity.
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Table 2 – Decomposition of the variance of aggregate growth rates of productivity, sales, and profit.
Table 2(a) reports the fraction of aggregate variance of productivity, sales, and profit growth rates that is accounted
for by pairwise covariances in firm productivity, sales, and profit growth rates:
∑
ω Cov(x,X)/Var(X), where x and
X are firm and aggregate growth rates. The fractions are reported as averages over years within each decade for the
decades ending 1975, 1985, 1995, 2005, and 2015. Table 2(a) also reports summary statistics for each decade: average
fraction of annual U.S. GDP accounted for by Compustat firms during, average number of active firms in Compustat,
and total number of firm-year observations. The top panel of Table 2(b) reports the relative contributions that
firms make to the variance of aggregate productivity, sales, and profit growth, for firms in different productivity
deciles. The relative contributions are reported as averages for the firms within each productivity decile, relative to
the cross-sectional average for firms in all deciles. The bottom panel of Table 2(b) shows the relative amounts of
systematic risk that firms expose investor to.
(a) Sum of Pairwise Covariances, Relative to Aggregate Variance
Fraction of Variance 1966–1975 1976–1985 1986–1995 1996–2005 2006–2015
Productivity 0.81 0.85 0.90 0.84 0.85
s.e. (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Sales 0.79 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.94
s.e. (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Profit 0.69 0.85 0.88 0.83 0.72
s.e. (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.17)
Decade Descriptions
Avg Fraction of GDP 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.25
Avg Firms per Year 279 1026 1357 1519 1655
Firm-Year Observations 5481 13452 13291 15261 16951
(b) Firm-Aggregate Covariance, Firm-Aggregate Covariance Over Market Value, Relative to
Average Firm
Covariance Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High
Productivity 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.26 0.46 0.84 1.63 6.43
s.e. (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.10) (0.14) (0.27)
Sales 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.21 0.28 0.52 0.91 1.70 6.12
s.e. (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09) (0.22)
Profit 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.45 0.85 1.46 6.85
s.e. (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.29)
Covariance-Over-Value
Productivity 1.97 2.53 1.07 1.22 0.77 0.67 0.51 0.32 0.09 0.35
s.e. (1.29) (0.35) (0.19) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.19) (0.03) (0.06)
Sales 3.14 1.62 1.19 0.93 0.67 0.53 0.34 0.22 0.13 0.28
s.e. (0.69) (0.35) (0.21) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Profit 1.43 3.64 1.73 0.81 0.79 0.61 0.34 0.27 0.10 0.28
s.e. (1.65) (0.47) (0.21) (0.16) (0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Decile Descriptions
Avg Fraction of GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Avg Firms per Year 1644 1908 1903 1863 1769 1587 1400 1159 891 701
Firm-Year Observations 6465 6442 6444 6444 6435 6451 6448 6440 6446 6421
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The question is whether firm-level total factor productivity accounts for a non-negligible
amount of the cross-sectional variation in firm-aggregate covariances and firm-aggregate
covariances over value for productivity, sales, and profit in the Compustat data, after
controlling for other sources of firm-aggregate covariance: the financial strength of firms,
and firm characteristics like industry, age, and size. I find tentative support for the model’s
two predictions. Results are reported in Table 3.
The regression equation is given by
sω Cov(xω, X)
Base
















where xω is firm-level productivity, sales, or profit growth, X is firm-level productivity, sales,
or profit growth, and where “Base” is either aggregate variance Var(X) or firm value Vω.
The equation constitutes an estimated dependent variable model, because the left-hand
side covariances are rolling-window estimates. Hausman (2001) and Lewis and Linzer (2005)
discuss the econometric issues that arise in estimated dependent variable models like these.
Hausman reminds us that an estimated dependent variable doesn’t bias results as long as
the classical ordinary least squares assumptions are met. Of course, they may not be met:
Of particular concern is whether the firm covariances have sampling errors that vary in the
cross-section of firms. Lewis and Linzer find that feasible generalized least squares works
well if heteroskedasticity in the standard errors of the estimated dependent variable are
large; otherwise, they recommend ordinary least squares using White’s estimator (1980)
for consistency. The right-hand side variables in Equation (30) include controls for sources
of firm-level covariance that have been emphasized in previous studies. These alternative
sources of firm-level covariance are briefly described below.
Financial Strength. Firms that rely on funds from banks and financial markets to run
their businesses may respond similarly when the cost or availability of funds changes. Fama
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and French (1992) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) have argued that changes in access
to external funds most affect small and financially weak firms, but recent work by Chari
et al. (2007) and Crouzet and Mehrotra (2017) calls this view into question. I use firm
leverage and liquidity ratios to control for financial strength as a source of comovement in
Equation (30). For leverage, I follow Rajan and Zingales (1995) in defining three different
ratios, the primary one being debt-to-equity. I follow Davydenko (2012) for measures of
liquidity: cash and accounts receivable over current liabilities, and the interest coverage
ratio as an alternative measure. Crouzet and Mehrotra (2017) use cash to assets.
Other controls. Firm fixed effects capture the impact of industry and other time-invariant
firm-specific characteristics on firm-aggregate covariance. Industry effects might arise for a
few reasons: First, industry-specific shocks generate higher covariance between firm pairs
within an industry in the obvious way. Second, network effects may generate pairwise
covariances. A shock to an individual industry can propagate outward from that industry to
“connected” industries through the input-output network, where the propagation may run
from supplier to customer (Acemoglu et al., 2012) or from customer to supplier (Herskovic
et al., 2017). Unfortunately, these network connections are not captured by Compustat, so
network effects not captured by firm fixed effects will show up in the error term. While the
firm-level fixed effects control for time-invariant firm-level characteristics, I also explicitly
control for two time-varying firm characteristics: size, and age. I control for these traits
because large firms, and more mature firms, are known to differ systematically from their
smaller, younger counterparts.
Table 3 reports regression results. The results lend tentative support to hypothesis (1) for
productivity, sales, and profit growth, with positive coefficients on total factor productivity
that are significant at the 10% level. In addition, larger firms (by employment) covary more
with aggregate growth rates. Neither the financial control variables for leverage and liquidity
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Table 3 – Regressions of Cov(x,X)/Base on firm productivity and control variables. Results from the
regression of Cov(x,X)/Base on firm productivity and the following additional explanatory variables, where x and
X are firm and aggregate growth rates, respectively, of total factor productivity, sales, and profit, and where Base
is either aggregate variance Var(X) or firm market value Vt(ω). The ratio Cov(x,X)/Var(X) represents each firm’s
contribution to aggregate variance as a share of the total, and the ratio Cov(x,X)/Vt(ω) represents the amount
of systematic risk investors accept for every dollar they invest in the firm. The explanatory variables are: total
factor productivity as the main variable of interest, liquidity as measured by the quick ratio, leverage as measured
by the debt-to-capital ratio, firm age as measured by years in Compustat, firm size as measured by employment
share. Regressions include firm fixed effects to capture unobserved time-invariant firm-level characteristics. Table
(a) reports results from the regression of Cov(x,X)/Var(X) on firm productivity and explanatory variables. Table
(b) reports results from the regression of Cov(x,X)/Vt(ω) on firm productivity and explanatory variables.
(a) Regression of Cov(x,X)/Var(X) on firm productivity and control variables
x, X = Productivity Growth Sales Growth Profit Growth
Olley-Pakes Total Factor Productivity 0.053∗ 0.052∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.026) (0.037)
Debt-to-Book Equity 0.006 0.002 0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Quick Ratio −0.000 −0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Years in Compustat 0.022∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Employment Share 0.124∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.034) (0.029)
R-squared 0.576 0.502 0.551
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(b) Regression of Cov(x,X)/Vt(ω) on firm productivity and control variables
x, X = Productivity Growth Sales Growth Profit Growth
Olley-Pakes Total Factor Productivity −0.059∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.008) (0.012)
Debt-to-Book Equity −0.018 0.005 0.003
(0.027) (0.013) (0.010)
Quick Ratio −0.008∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Years in Compustat −0.103∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Employment Share −0.000 0.012 0.035∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
R-squared 0.443 0.420 0.368
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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are significant. The results also lend support to hypothesis (2) for productivity, sales, and
profit growth, with negative coefficients on total factor productivity that are significant at the
1% level for productivity and sales, and at the 5% level for profit. Leverage is insignificant,
but higher liquidity appears to reduce firm-aggregate covariance over market value, as one
might expect. Unfortunately, direct tests of firm-level diversification on firm-aggregate
covariance using Compustat segment counts yielded insignificant results—likely due to the
coarseness of the Compustat diversification measure (see Villalonga, 2004, for a discussion).
More sophisticated methods of measuring the cross-sectional covariance structure, along
with more granular diversification measures, will help test the diversification hypothesis
more directly.
6 Conclusion
This paper advances the idea that when many firms choose similar risks, their economic
fortunes then rise and fall together, creating aggregate fluctuations and systemic risks.
To motivate this interpretation, I document four patterns in the comovement of firm-
level productivity, sales, and profit growth rates for a large panel of public firms in the
United States over the last half-century, and develop a model economy that produces the
patterns endogenously. My contributions build on recent work on the microeconomic origins
of aggregate fluctuations, on financial risk in production economies, and on endogenous
fluctuations in macroeconomic models.
Empirical evidence from Compustat highlights the pervasiveness of firm-level covariance
in all stages of value creation, and in most years during the last half-century. Figure 1
illustrates the evidence for productivity, sales, and profit growth rates, and Table 2 reports
numerical results. Pairwise covariances in firm-level growth rates drive the variance of
aggregate growth rates for these variables, in most years accounting for upwards of 80% of
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the aggregate variance. High-productivity firms are particularly important in generating
the covariance in firm-level growth rates, contributing over six times what the average firm
contributes. Despite the scale of their contributions to aggregate variance, high-productivity
firms are less risky to investors per dollar of market value. They are less risky because
they engage in at least some economic activities—operating certain technologies, selling to
certain customers—that few other firms engage in.
The theoretical framework produces firm-level productivity covariance endogenously.
When firms choose technology sets, they often choose to operate similar technologies. They
are exposed to similar sources of technological uncertainty, and their productivities covary.
The framework endogenously generates aggregate uncertainty from microeconomic shocks,
captures qualitative features of the cross-section of stock returns, matches a host of stylized
facts related to firm-level variance and covariance, and captures empirical regularities related
to the number of technologies, product lines, and business segments firms operate. Yet
the model remains highly tractable, and relies on a simple mechanism: firms choose their
technologies, and therefore choose their risks.
Regressions serve as a plausibility check on the model’s predictions. I regress the rolling-
window firm-aggregate covariances for productivity, sales, and profit growth on firm-level
total factor productivity, controlling for some common explanations of covariance in the
literature: firm financial strength, fixed firm characteristics like industry, and time-varying
ones like size and age. The regressions provide tentative support for the model’s main
predictions.
I see several new avenues of inquiry related to this work. The first is to examine
cross-sectional covariance structure for small firms. In the present paper, I examine the
upper tail of the firm size distribution, as Compustat excludes most small and all private
firms. With access to administrative micro datasets, a similar exercise to this one could
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be carried out for small firms. Second: entry, exit, and dynamic aspects of the technology
adoption and abandonment could be studied in an environment with endogenous uncertainty.
When firms enter or exit, or change their technology sets, these activities can impact
co-movement and volatility over time and in the cross-section in ways that could magnify
aggregate fluctuations and systemic risk. Third: there is scope to more robustly characterize
cross-sectional heterogeneity in firm-level productivity correlations than I have done here.
Dynamic factor models and spatial econometric techniques offer two alternative approaches.
45
A Appendix
This appendix provides additional discussion on several aspects of the paper. It provides a
basic mathematical discussion of the model presented in Section 3, proofs of the propositions
in Section 4, details of the productivity estimation procedure I use. The discussion includes
first-order conditions for the decision problems of the representative household and of
consumption goods producers, and derivations of the propositions presented in section 4.
A.1 Mathematical discussion of the model
A.1.1 Optimality conditions
Optimality conditions for the representative household. The household solves its utility maxi-
mization problem in two stages. The two-stage budgeting procedure is possible here because
the period utility function u(Cs) depends only on the basket Ct, and Ct is homogeneous of
degree one (Gorman, 1959). Consider the first-stage problem in (11). Eliminate constraint






Cs +Ks+1 + ∫
ω∈Ω
Vs(ω)Ss+1(ω)λ(dω)






To get first-order optimality conditions, equate with zero the first derivatives of L with
respect to choice variables Cs, Ks+1, Ss+1(ω), and λs for arbitrary period s and firm ω.
The household’s optimal plans for consumption, capital accumulation, and equity shares,
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The household’s stochastic discount factor also derives from these conditions: set s = t










The one-period stochastic discount factor is then the first term in the expectation operator:
mt,t+1 = βu
′(Ct+1)/u
′(Ct) . Iterate (35) via Vt+1(ω) to get the multi-period stochastic
discount factor. For any period s ≥ t, write the latter as















Next, solve the household’s second-stage problem of allocating consumption across
varieties ct(v, ω) within the aggregate basket Ct. Let Pt(v, ω) be the nominal price of variety
ct(v, ω), and Pt be the nominal price of the consumption basket Ct. The household takes
the optimal amount of aggregate consumption Ct as given by the first-stage problem, and
takes nominal prices as given, and maximizes its consumption of varieties for each unit of
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Taking the first derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to consumption varieties ct(v, ω), ct(v′, ω′),
and setting equal to zero,
C−1t ct(v, ω)
− 1

























































































Now recall 1 = PtCt, and define pt(v, ω) := Pt(v, ω)/Pt. The above expressions imply the



















Optimality conditions for consumption goods producers. Consider firm ω’s profit maxi-
mization problem (5). Eliminate constraints by using (3) and (39) to substitute for pt(v, ω)
and yt(v, ω) in the firm-vintage profit function (4) that appears in (5). Obtain first-order
optimality conditions by equating with zero the first derivatives of Πt(ω) with respect to
choice variables kt(v, ω) and lt(v, ω) for arbitrary vintage v. Firm ω’s optimal choice of
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capital for production with vintage v satisfies











Its optimal choice of labor satisfies











Notice that the optimal capital-labor ratio depends neither on the individual firm nor on












Optimality conditions for capital goods producers. Now consider the profit maximization





wt = (1− α)Zt(kt)α(lt)−α. (44)













A.1.2 Main propositions and proofs
Proposition 4.1 Let zt(v) now be a random preference multiplier. Replace the stochas-
tic production function in equation (3) with equation (3′) below, and the non-stochastic
preferences in equation (12) with equation (12′) below:




















Then the propositions of this section remain true after derivation of the appropriate stochastic
household demand curve for individual varieties.
Proof. The proof starts by re-deriving the demand-curve, following appendix A.1.1 but












































Taking the first derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to consumption varieties ct(v, ω), ct(v′, ω′),






























The remaining steps of the derivation are straight-forward and follow the derivation in
appendix A.1.1 closely.
Proposition 4.2 A productivity aggregate over technologies summarizes all of the












A productivity aggregate over firms summarizes all of the firm-specific and technological










Aggregate factor demands, production, and profit can be written in terms of aggregate
productivities and variables that either do not vary across firms, in the case of firm aggregates,
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or do not vary across firms or technologies, in the case of economy-wide aggregates.
Proof. The household and capital goods producer are representative, so aggregation pertains
only to the final goods sector.
Start with the optimality conditions (40) and (41) from the firm’s decision problem (5).
These expressions contain vintage-specific variables kt(v, ω), lt(v, ω), and yt(v, ω) as well as
variables and parameters common to all vintages. Combine equations (40) and (41) with
the production function (3) to obtain expressions for kt(v, ω), lt(v, ω), and yt(v, ω) in terms
of zt(v) and variables and parameters common to all vintages:

































These expressions can be simplified further using an expression derived from the definition




















































































Now recall that pt(v, ω) = (yt(v, ω)/Yt)−(1/θ), and use above to get a similar expression
for profit:









To get firm aggregates, sum the kt(v, ω)’s, lt(v, ω)’s, and πt(v, ω)’s, and use the Dixit-




































































Further rearrangement along the same lines yields the economy-wide aggregates. It is
also possible to write aggregate output in terms of a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production







where the production function arguments should be understood as optimal factor inputs
that satisfy the firm’s optimality conditions for from the profit maximization problem (see
Felipe and Fisher, 2003, for a discussion).
Notice that the firm-level aggregate production function takes the familiar Cobb-Douglas
form. But remember that the distribution of shocks is endogenous, and the underlying
technology choice problem imposes additional structure on the firm-level productivity
multipliers. In particular, if technology sets V(ω) differs across firms, so too will the
distributions of the random productivity multipliers. And to the extent that technology sets
share common elements, firm-level productivity will covary. The next three propositions
make these statements rigorous.
Proposition 4.3 In non-stochastic steady state, any firm ω with productivity z(ω) ≥ z
chooses technology set V(ω) =
{
v ∈ V : v ≤ v ≤ v(ω)
}
, where the endogenous cut-offs z and
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Firms with z(ω) < z do not produce. Under parameter restrictions, firms ω1 and ω2
with productivities z < z(ω1) < z(ω2) choose technology sets such that Vt(ω1) ⊂ Vt(ω2).
The above cut-offs are also first-order approximate to those that obtain in a stochastic
environment.
Proof. Firms choose their technology sets V(ω) ⊆ V = [v,∞) ⊆ R+ to maximize profit.
Recall from subsubsection 3.1.3 that technologies differ in their period fixed costs, but not























































From here, either evaluate the productivities in the ratio under the expectation operator
at their expected values to get an expression describing steady-state technology sets, or
take an approximation of the expression under the expectation operator. A first-order



















Notice that the cut-off v(ω) increasing in z(ω), so the more productive firms produce
more varieties and use more technology.
Two remarks are in order: First, it is useful that the steady-state and first-order
approximate cut-offs coincide, because it means that first-order dynamics around the steady
state are completely standard in this model. Second, the second-order approximate case gives
more interesting but less tractable results. There is a covariance term in the second-oder
approximation that varies with v—covariance is higher for commonly-used technologies.
Proposition 4.4 Let technology sets be those that firms choose in non-stochastic steady





















The first and second moments of aggregate productivity are given by µ and σ2, respectively:
µ = µεζµ1z
ζµ2 , (59)
σ2 = σ2ε ζσ1z
ζσ2 . (60)
Under parameter restrictions, the first and second moments of all productivity aggregates
are positive and finite, and for any firms ω1 and ω2 with z(ω1) < z(ω2), it holds that
µt(ω1) < µt(ω2) and σ2t (ω1) < σ2t (ω2).







































where Ωv is the set of firms using vintage v, that is: Ωv :=
{
ω ∈ Ω : z(v) < z(ω)
}
, and z(v)
is the inverse of the cost cut-off v(ω).

















































































































θ−1 λ(dv) + . . . .
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γ[κ− (θ − 1)]− (θ − 1)
)(
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κ− (θ − 1)
)
ζµ2 := κ− (θ − 1)















































(θ − 1)− κ
z(v)−[κ−(θ−1)]λ(dω)
,























































































































































θ−1 appears on the right-hand side. Substituting it for z, and collecting
parameters,









κ− (θ − 1)
)2( (θ − 1)


















κ− (θ − 1)
]
.
Proposition 4.5 Let technology sets be those that firms choose in the non-stochastic
















The covariance between firm and aggregate productivity, expressed as a fraction of firm





























Under parameter restrictions, covariance-over-value falls for all z(ω) above a threshold.
The ratio also falls in the level of aggregate output.
Proof. To start, identify a specific firm ω1, use the definitions of Zt(ω1) and Zt in the
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where I have assumed w.l.g. that v(ω) ∈ N.
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κ− (θ − 1)
z(v)−[κ−(θ−1)]λ(dv),
where line two changes measure from Lebesgue to Pareto. Continuing with the second



















































θ−1 λ(dv) + . . .
.
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γ[κ− (θ − 1)] + (θ − 1)
)
ζωΩ1 =
γ[κ− (θ − 1)]
γ
.
Recall that the µ appearing in ζωΩ1 has already been expressed in terms of parameters,
so the above expression suffices.






























































































































































































































σ2ε (θ − 1)






















, ζV 4 := (θ − 1).
Proposition 4.6 Let technology sets be those that firms choose in the non-stochastic
steady state, and let Zt(ω1) and Zt(ω2) be firm productivities for firms ω1 and ω2, where










is decreasing in the distance between productivities,
|z(ω1)− z(ω2)|.
Proof.
Proposition 4.7 Let technology sets be those that firms choose in the non-stochastic













where I define firm ω’s return as rt(ω) =
[
Vt+1(ω) + Πt+1(ω) − Ft+1(ω)
]
/Vt(ω), and the
risk-free rate as rf,t = m−1t,t+1. Under parameter restrictions, expected excess returns decrease
in firm productivity z(ω) for all z(ω) above a threshold.
Proof. Start with the definition of firm ω’s stock return:
rt+1(ω) =





















where the third line assumes log utility and uses the definition of the household stochastic
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Consider the covariance term separately, and recall that zero serial correlation has been
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where the second line uses the assumption of zero serial correlation. Now recall from (53)

























Next, second-order approximate the individual right-hand side expectations around










































































































































≈ ζr1µ(ω) + ζr2σωΩ(ω),

































































Equilibrium requires that the following market clearing conditions hold:












kt(v, ω)λ(dvdω) + kt,







In the steady state equilibrium, random productivities take their expected values
(zt(v)θ−1 = µε, ∀v ∈ V), and capital and consumption are constant over time (Ct+1 = Ct =
C∗,Kt+1 = Kt = K
∗). Under these conditions, solving for steady-state values of endogenous
variables is straight forward.
Begin by solving for the steady state wage and rental rate. In steady state, (33) becomes
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1 = β(1 + r∗ − δ). Using (43) to substitute for r∗:
1 = β(1 + r∗ − δ)


























































Next, find an expression for the steady-state aggregate capital stock. Start with the
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l∗(v, ω)λ(dvdω) + l∗.
































Recall that L is exogenous, so the above expression suffices. Next, use the law of motion
for capital to find a steady-state expression for investment demand It:
K∗ = I∗ + (1− δ)K∗










A.2 Discussion of the Data
A.2.1 Productivity estimation
I follow the procedures in Olley and Pakes (1996) and İmrohoroğlu and Tuzel (2014), and
estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function in log form. The estimation equation is given
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by:
ln(Yω,t) = α0 + αK ln(Kω,t) + αL ln(Lω,t) + ln(Zω,t), (65)
where the residual Zω,t is firm-level total factor productivity. The procedure assumes
Zω,t = ξω,tηω,t, where Zω,t is unknown to the econometrician, but ξω,t is known to the firm.
Olley and Pakes (1996) use a simple behavioral model to derive reduced-form decision
rules for firms deciding each period whether to exit or continue producing, and if continuing,
how much new capital to purchase. Firms’ decision rules depend on their current knowledge
of productivity ξω,t. Each firm’s exit decision is captured by an indicator function χω,t:
χω,t =

1 if ξω,t > ξω,t
0 otherwise,
(66)




















regression equation (65) becomes










controls for the forecastable component of firm productivity, and is
approximated by a polynomial in ln(Kω,t) and ln(Iω,t), denoting a firm’s capital stock and
investment. I include time-industry controls in this stage to prevent time-industry effects
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from influencing the first-stage estimates. The remaining estimation equations are given by:
Pi,t = Pt(ii,t, ki,t) (69)
ln(Yω,t)− αL ln(Lω,t) = αL ln(Lω,t) + g(Pi,t, φi,t − βkki,t) + ln(ξω,t+1) + ln(ηω,t+1). (70)
In the second stage, each firm’s probability of exit is estimated by equation (69) using
probit, where Pt(ii,t, ki,t) is approximated by a polynomial in it and kt. Finally, equation (70)
is estimated by non-linear least squares, using estimates from stages one and two for Pi,t
and φi,t, and approximating g(Pi,t, φi,t − βkki,t) non-parametrically. The non-parametric
functions φ, P, and g are derived in greater detail in Olley and Pakes (1996).
I map model variables to Compustat variables in the following way, writing Compustat
variables in fixed-width font: labor expense is Lω,t = WAGE× EMP; capital is Kω,t = L.PPENT,
value added is Yω,t = OIBDP + WAGE× EMP.
İmrohoroğlu and Tuzel (2014) use an expanding estimation window to prevent information
that would have been unavailable to market participants in a particular period from distorting
results when they combine estimated productivity with financial market data. I find that
the expanding window approach leads to large differences in the volatility of production
function estimates in earlier periods relative to later periods. This increased volatility biases
the rolling-window covariance estimates in early years, so I instead use the full sample period
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